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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES: A COMMENT
ON THE INAPPROPRIATE USES
OF AN OLD ANALOGY
William W. Van Alstyne*
I.

"The petitioner," Holmes declared, "may have a constitutional
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman. 111 Three quarters of a century later, however, the Supreme Court made a different observation:
To the extent that the [opinion below] may be read to suggest that
teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First
Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment
on matters of public interest in connection with the operation of the
public schools in which they work, it proceeds on a premise that has
been unequivocally rejected in numerous prior decisions of this Court.2

The "numerous prior decisions" to which the Court referred, and
others to which it might also have referred in rejecting the constitutional orphanage of public employees, all appeared during the
three decades of Supreme Court service by Mr. Justice Douglas.
No one has done more than he to secure the equal protection
of public employees under the Bill of Rights. Never impressed
by the suggestion that the state is somehow not so much the
state when it is also an employer, he has steadfastly denied that
those whose livelihood is linked with government must accept their
labor as a mere privilege which the state may ration without constitutional review. Rather, many of Justice Douglas' rugged contributions to the con.stitutional rights of public employees reflect a
single, essential proposition: The state is always the state and
therefore always constrained by the Constitution irrespective of the
capacity in which it acts.
What government is forbidden to do directly it may not do by
indirection; what is not justified when sanctioned by fine or jail is
no more justified when sanctioned instead by a threat to the source

* Professor of Law, Duke University.
1
2

McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892).
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
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of one's livelihood. As the first amendment will protect an employee
from the threat of jail for writing letters in support of a given candidate or for serving as a poll watcher, so should it also protect him
from the loss of his nonsupervisory public job. 3 If a citizen cannot
be subjected to a fine without a fair hearing, neither may he be
threatened with an equally important loss such as discharge from
his public employment without a hearing. 4 The immunities of the
Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment are straightforward
and unqualified, and no reason has ever existed to give them a
cramped construction. The fourteenth amendment provides unequivocally that "No State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law"; it leaves no quarter for a
different, more grudging view that "this amendment shall not apply
when the state acts in a proprietary, rather than in a governmental
capacity." 5 The first amendment is firm and universal in its mandate that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech"; it yields no insinuation that "this amendment does not
apply to congressionally authorized standards for federal employment."
In the private sector, an employer may, of course, be unpoliced
by the Bill of Rights and-for lack of the requisite state actionan employee correspondingly circumscribed in his freedom according to the terms of the contract permitted, though not required,
by the State. 6 Even here, however, the State cannot insinuate itself into the transaction and trammel the employee's freedoms for
purposes of its own which are forbidden by the Constitution. 7 And
B United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 115, 122 (1947) (Douglas, J .,
dissenting) .
·
4 Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 899 (1961) (dissenting
opinion).
5 See the observation of Chief Justice Stone in Graves v. New York ex rel.
O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 477 (1939): "As [the federal] government derives its authority
wholly from powers delegated to it by the Constitution, its every action within its
constitutional power is governmental action . . . ." See also the remarks by Mr.
Justice Douglas in Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670, 674, 678 (1967) (concurring opinion) : "It is not dispositive to maintain that a private landlord might
terminate a lease at his pleasure. For this is government we are dealing with, and
the actions of government are circumscribed by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment."
6 But see Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292, 302 (1956) (dissenting
opinion) : "Employers can, of course, hire whom they choose, arranging for an allDemocratic labor force if they desire. But the courts may not be implicated in such
a discriminatory scheme. Once the courts put their imprimatur on such a contract,
government, speaking through the judicial branch, acts. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1; Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249."
7 See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369 (1967); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Greene v. McElroy,
360 U.S. 474 (1959); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923); Myer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). Cf. Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S.
175 (1915); Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903).
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the fact that a private employer may enforce a given condition
without constitutional restraint yields nothing about employment
prerogatives in the public sector, since. it is the lazy analogy between the two sectors which is condemned by the express constitutional distinction between private and governmental action. Exactly because it is the state (if only the state) which is foreclosed
from negotiating terms permitted to private employers, nothing instructive of governmental power can ever be received by false analogical reasoning from what is permitted in the private sector.
That a private school does not want and cannot be compelled by
force of the fourteenth amendment alone to permit its teaching
staff to ventilate evolutionary theory obviously says nothing about
permissible public school standards. 8 That a zealous private landlord may restrict his choice of janitors and tenants to politically
like-minded persons merely underscores the difference, not the similarity, in constitutional models. 9 So far as government may insinuate its authority and largesse, it remains uniformly constrained. 10
In half a nutshell, 11 it is this gradual and overdue return to
fundamentals which characterizes much of Mr. Justice Douglas'
8 See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). Cj. Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn.
105, 109-12, 289 S.W. 363, 364-65 (1927). ("In dealing with its own employees en-

gaged upon its own work, the state is not hampered by the limitations of . . . the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")
9 Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670 (1967).
10 Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 404 ( 1963): "It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion
and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a
benefit or privilege."
11 A look into the other half of the nutshell would spy some reservations. For
instance, Mr. Justice Douglas tacitly concurred in the opinion for the Court in
Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 277-78 (1968), in which Mr. Justice Fortas
acknowledged some interests the government holds qua employer-interests sufficient
to uphold some demands which it might not make of persons with whom it lacked an
employment relationship: "It is argued that although a lawyer could not constitutionally be confronted with Hobson's choice between self-incrimination and forfeiting
his means of livelihood, the same principle should not protect a policeman. Unlike tl!e
lawyer, he is directly, immediately, and entirely responsible to the city or State
which is his employer. He owes his entire loyalty to it. He has no other 'client' or
principal. He is a trustee of the public interest, bearing the burden of great and total
responsibility to his public employer. Unlike the lawyer who is directly responsible
to his client, the policeman is either responsible to the State or to no one.
"We agree tl!at these factors differentiate the situations."
Similarly, Douglas tacitly concurred in Mr. Justice Marshall's qualification of
his remark in Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968), that the first
amendment equally protects public school teachers: "At the same time it cannot be
gainsaid that the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its
employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general."
That tl!e employment relationship may sustain some regulations which would be
unconstitutional in the absence of such a relationship, moreover, is developed in Part
III, infra.
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significant contributions to the rights of public employees. Reference to the virtuoso collection of cases appearing in two articles
by Hans Linde, commemorating the Justice's twenty-fifth year on
the Supreme Court, will attest to the strength of his position.12 The
last five years have largely added confirming opinions plus increasing support from the rest of the Court on important holdings in
public employment cases.13 The professional literature so thoroughly
abounds with additional writing equally effective in demolishing
earlier excuses for state misconduct (e.g., employment as a "privilege," the state is exempt when acting as a "proprietor," the individual "agreed" to the terms or "waived" his rights) that the point
is now plain: 14 the state is the state, bound by uniform constitutional constraints regardless of the capacity in which it purports to
act.
12 See Linde, Justice Douglas on Freedom in the Welfare State: Constitutional
Rights in the Public Sector, 39 WAsH. L. REv. 4 (1964), 40 WAsH. L. REv. 10 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Linde].
13 The principal public employment and closely related public sector cases
decided since Professor Linde's articles appeared are these: Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968); Sanitation Men v. Sanitation Comm'r, 392 U.S. 280 (1968);
Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S.
563 (1968); Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968); Becker v. Philco Corp., 389
U.S. 979, 984 (1968) (dissenting opinion); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258
(1967); Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967); Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386
U.S. 670, 674 (1967) (concurring opinion); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589 (1967); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U:S. 511 (1967); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S.
493 (1967); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. II6 (1966); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11
(1966); Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234 (1966).
In addition, several lower federal court decisions and several high state court
decisions are of such obvious importance as to merit explicit reference: Meehan v.
Macy, 392 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Turner v. Kennedy, 332 F.2d 304 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 901 (1964); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d
150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Rudder v. United States, 226 F.2d
51 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Swaaley v. United States, 376 F.2d 857 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Parrish
v. Civil Service Comm'n, 66 C.2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967);
Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 401 (1966); Fort v. Civil Service Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 331, 392 P.2d 385, 38
Cal. Rptr. 625 (1964); Lawson v. Housing Authority, 270 Wis. 269, 70 N.W.2d 605,
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 882 (1955).
14 See, e.g., O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings
Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 443 (1966); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733
( 1964). A large collection of other references is provided in the footnotes to Linde's
article, supra note 12, and in the California Supreme Court's heavily annotated opinion
in Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55
Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966), as well as in footnote 1 of an able student Comment, Another
Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 144, 144 (1968). See also
Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law,
81 HARv. L. REV. 1439 (1968); Comment, The First Amendment and Public Employees-An Emerging Constitutional Right To Be a Policeman?, 37 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 409 (1968); Note, The Public Employee and Political Activity, SUFFOLK L.
REV. 380 (1969).
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II.
The emphatic rejection of the analogical model (that what is
constitutionally permitted in the private sector is therefore permitted to government when it acts in a "private" way, e.g., as entrepreneur, proprietor, or employer), however, merely clears the air
of canards. By itself, it yields very few positive answers as to what
the state is forbidden to do, even granting that the state is always
the state. Rather, it returns the constitutional inquiry to dead center. Thus, while the mere fact that a private employer's freedom
to hire his nephews in preference to others is not enough to show
that a public employer may do the same thing, neither is it enough
to show that the public employer may not do the same thing. Similarly, the fact that the Constitution does not forbid a private employer from terminating an employee without a hearing does not in
itself yield any inference that a public employer must provide a
hearing to its employees. Rejection of the analogical model merely
denies any constitutional correspondence between the private and
public sectors; it yields no negative inference that whatever is
permitted to private employers is thereby forbidden to the public
employer. Rather, problems in the public sector are returned to
the vagaries of substantive due process and equal protection clauses,
more at sea than before for loss of an old, inept, but once-felt
useful analogy.
Without some analogical model enabling courts to move from
a more settled area of constitutional interpretation toward coherence in a less settled area where the problems appear to be "similar," moreover, we may seem to suffer from an uneasiness or apparent lack of consistency (or failure of neutral principles, if you will)
in the decisional process. The failure of the one analogical model
consequently leads one to yearn to find another. There is, after all,
a feeling that public employment cases are "harder" than or "different" from conventional state regulation cases, needing something
to be supplied as a reliable model for guidelines. For instance, what
shall be said of a case where the public employee is subject to mandatory discharge in the event he.is convicted of an act of civil disturbance? Or another, conditioning employment of state employed
accountants on abstinence from smoking (so hazardous to one's
health)? Or a third, requiring an oath to support and defend the
Constitution as a prerequisite to eligibility to work for a municipal
sanitation department? Self-evident answers may not readily occur
unless . . . well, unless one can say that these cases are really
the "same" as (or analogous in all significant respects to) others
where we think that we already know the answer. Or, even though

UCLA LAW REVIEW
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we do not positively know the answer under the analogical model,
at least we think we know how to determine what it most probably
would be and can borrow a corresponding confidence in settling the
matter at hand.
It is precisely here that Professor Linde believes that an analogy can be found-an analogy, moreover, which surprisingly again
makes use of government and the private sector, albeit in a wholly
different way. As I understand his thesis (presumably synthesized from Mr. Justice Douglas' opinions), it is essentially this:
The constitutionality vel non of a condition restricting public employment (or any other important governmental connection, e.g.,
welfare, housing, or education) is the same as the constitutionality
vel non of the same restraint imposed by government on equivalent
employment in the private sector. If a given governmentally imposed regulation of equivalent jobs in the private sector will survive all constitutional objections of the private employees whom
it regulates, it will also survive such objections when it appears
merely as a condition of public employment instead. If it would
not survive constitutional objection when proposed as a government regulation in the private sector, however, neither is it valid
as a condition in the public sector. In short, the allegedly proper
question to raise, in testing a requirement or condition of public
employment for constitutionality, is this:
The question is whether the guarantees of liberty remain the same
when the welfare state provides public benefits and services as they
are when government seeks to regulate private conduct by law.l6

The analogical model does not, as noted above, merely purport
to trade one problem for another of equal perplexity. Rather, if it
works (and that is what we mean to examine hereafter), it allowably will yield a clearer perception of the problem, cut away obfuscations, and provide a context where an answer is more readily
forthcoming. This is, of course, a claim-but the proof of the claim
may allegedly be seen in any one of the several excellent illustrations Professor Linde provides. One of these is taken from Hamil- .
ton v. Regents of University of California, 16 in which the Court
originally upheld the exclusion of students otherwise eligible for
admission to the University of California who refused on grounds
of religious scruple to enroll in the compulsory ROTC program.
At the time Hamilton was decided, the Court disregarded its then
recent decisions on the subject of unconstitutional conditions.17
15 Linde, supra note 12, 40 WAsH. L. REv. at 26.
16 293
245 (1934).
17 See, e.g., Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Cornrn'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94

u.s.
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Instead, it emphasized that attendance at the university was voluntary rather than compulsory, it characterized matriculation as a
"privilege" rather than as a right, and it concluded that the condition
of attendance was valid against a religious freedom claim since,
while students had a right to be free of state-coerced activity contrary to abiding religious convictions, they had no right to a statesubsidized education.18 Subsequently, in Board of Education v.
Barnette,1 9 Hamilton was distinguished on the basis that in Barnette
the children reserving religious objections to a compulsory flag salute
were subject to treatment as delinquents if they were not attending
school where, of course, they had to participate in the flag salute as a
condition of remaining. The net effect of the flag-salute requirement
was not merely to confront the students with the hard enough choice
of respecting their religious commitment and forfeiting free education, or of taking the education while yielding their convictions.
Rather, they had either to attend school and salute the flag or risk
being prosecuted as delinquents (and have their parents criminally
prosecuted for contributing to the delinquency of a minor). Thus,
Hamilton was distinguished and not overruled.20
Under Professor Linde's view, however, the problem in Hamilton should be examined this way:
As far as the First Amendment is concerned, California's power
must be tested by whether it could require military training of students at all colleges, private as well as public. 21

And, in Barnette, the correct approach is this:
When West Virginia undertook to compel the flag salute at public
schools, it must be prepared to defend its constitutional power to
require the same at private schools, though it might not in fact do so.
When the constitutional question is thus posed, some apparently
difficult answers become almost self-evident. New York or Pennsylvania have broad authority over the curriculum that will satisfy the
standards of a compulsory school attendance law, but would anyone
argue that these standards could have included a requirement of the
"Regents' Prayer" or daily Bible readings for all schools, private
as well as public, without falling afoul of the establishment clause?22
(1926); Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922); Oppenheim, Unconstitutional Conditions and State Powers, 26 MicH. L. REV. 176 (1927).
·
18 More recently, however, the Court has "explained" Hamilton as having held
merely that the religious free exercise claim lacked merit. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 n.2 (1969).
19 319 u.s. 624 (1943).
20 ld. at 631-32. Additionally, as subsequently emphasized in Tinker, the Court
implied that congressional authority to raise armies by requiring compulsory officer
training might override an objection based solely on the free exercise clause. Id.
21 Linde, supra note 12, 40 WASH. L. REv. at 26.
22 Id. at 26-27.
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This way of looking at the case does indeed make the case appear
more resolvable by placing it in a more manageable context. We
are freed at the very outset from being misled into a wrong result
by conceding any significance to the adventitious manner in which
the governmental power is being exercised, i.e., we will not make
the mistake of thinking that the government is any less the government (and any less bound by the first amendment) when it operates as an employer or proprietor rather than as a legislator, the
better to see its "true" position.
Another illustration, also Professor Linde's, may convince the
few remaining doubters of the practical value of this analogical
model. A much vexed question still with us concerns the extent to
which a state may restrict the use of publicly held property from
popular assembly. In Hague v. C/0,23 the Court broadly implied
that a few kinds of public property, e.g., parks, street corners, or
other places customarily used as forums or locations for pamphleteering, could not be withdrawn from such use. Impliedly,
however, governmentally owned property having no similar tradition of public-forum use could be completely precluded from such
uses as long as the ban was total and therefore neutral in the sense
that no one is favored at all, and therefore no one is more favored
than anyone else.24 Mr. Justice Black's view, on the other hand
(happily not the prevailing view), is that government ownership
is sufficient per se to sustain a total ban on the use of any governmentally owned property as a place for activity unconnected with
its described use, whether or not that activity is disruptive, and
that a constitutional question arises only where the restriction is
incomplete (in which case the equal protection clause may come
into play).25

u.s.

307
496 (1939).
Compare Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393
U.S. 503 (1969); Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308 (1968); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966}; Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536 (1965}; Wolin v. Port of New York Port Authority, 268 F. Supp. 855
(S.D.N.Y. 1967}, aff'd, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968}; In
re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 383, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967); University Comm.
v. Gunn, 289 F. Supp. 469 (W.D. Tex. 1968}, juris. noted, 393 U.S. 819 (1968). See
also Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right of Access to the Media?, 37 GEo.
WAsH. L. REV. 487 (1969); Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment
Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967); Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum:
Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 1.
25 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
515-26 (1969) (dissenting); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966) (dictum);
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 162, 166 (1966) (dissenting); Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 559, 577, 578 (1965) (concurring and dissenting); H. BLAcK, A CoNSTITUTIONAL FAITH 58-63 (1968}; Justice Black and the Bill of Rights, CBS-TV Interview,
Dec. 3, 1968, reprinted in 27 CoNG. Q. 6 (1969).
23
24
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Using Professor Linde's analogical model, however, we come
to a conclusion quite opposed to Mr. Justice Black's and much
more generous than the Court's position in Hague. Under this view
it appears that the majority in Hague as well as Mr. Justice Black
were too beguiled by the irrelevancy of "government-as-owner,"
and that a correct perception of the issue would make clear that a
broader field of first amendment protection exists:
The proper constitutional test of reasons for restricting his speech
(or an ensuing parade) there [i.e., on the grounds of the veterans'
hospital] is whether the same reasons would or would not sustain,
over first amendment objections, the same government restriction of
speeches or parades at private hospitals. . . . [S]hould the principle
not be the same for all government real estate, for parks and beaches,
for public housing projects and college campuses, though the limits
derived from their distinctive characteristics, functions, and necessary conditions of use might differ?26

Thus, restrictions on places to speak must be justifiable in terms
of their necessity to protect other legitimate uses associated with
those places, and nothing whatever turns upon the source of ownership or customary use. If a decent concern for patient care would
warrant a state law forbidding noisy speeches within the curtilage
of a private hospital, it would sustain the same law as applied to the
curtilage of a public hospital. Public ownership in the latter case is
neither a necessary nor sufficient basis for the statute. Similarly, a
statute forbidding peaceful assembly on privately owned lots is no
stronger when limited, instead, to a ban on peaceful assembly on
publicly owned lots whether or not such lots were traditional forums.
It should be recognized, of course, that Professor Linde has
fashioned a model with much more in mind than a limited equal
protection claim in respect of statutory differentiations between the
public and private sector. The more limited claim would merely
observe that where the evil alleged to rationalize the need for a
statute can readily be seen to be no more nor less an evil in the private sector than in the public sector itself, a regulation forbidding
a given activity only in the public sector seems arbitrary-underinclusive without reason.27 For instance, if abstention from knowing and active membership in the Communist Party is required of
26 Linde, supra note 12, 40 WAsH. L. REv. at 42-43. See also id. at 37: "Are
the constitutional limits less stringent when government denies the right to speak on
public property than on private?"; the implication clearly being that they are not.
27 See generally Tussman & Tenbroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949). For an application of this view, invalidating a regulation
applicable only to publicly-assisted housing, see O'Meara v. Washington State Bd.
Against Discrimination, 58 Wash. 2d 793, 365 P.2d 1 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
839 (1962), reviewed critically in 8 HoWARD L.J. 158 (1962).
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a state hospital physician based on some notion that the nature
of his work carries intolerable risks for dangerous action, it must
equally require the same abstention from membership by a private
physician employed in similar tasks in a private hospital. Thus,
the public physician may be able to claim that in being subjected
to a restriction on his political association not imposed on all
others similarly situated in terms of the menace to be avoided, he
has been subjected to an invidious classification and denied equal
protection. Again, loyalty oaths for public, and not for private,
school teachers may be vulnerable to this sort of claim. The fact
that the Hatch Act forbids civil service supervisory personnel to solicit contributions from their subordinates while it does not equally
affect supervisory personnel in private business may seem arbitrary
if, indeed, the legitimate purpose of the Act is merely to reduce
opportunities for unfair or intimidating political pressure; the evil
and likelihood of such pressure are equally present in both cases.
There are, in short, myriad situations in which the fact that a
given restriction applies by law only to persons in the public sector,
but not in the private sector, may be constitutionally significant in
determining whether public employees have been denied equal protection. While sometimes helpful (perhaps to a greater extent than
thus far appreciated by the courts), however, this is both a different and a significantly lesser point than Professor Linde has made.
It is a lesser point, of course, because the equal protection claim
will frequently fail for lack of merit even when appropriately acknowledged. Conventionally, legislation is allowed to proceed by
degrees, experimentally resolving a felt problem by steps; it is not
a hard and fast rule that government must legislate against all of
a problem in order to legislate against any part of it.28 Frequently,
too, the public component of a given employment subject to regulation constitutes a very large majority of the whole area of that
employment, so that the underinclusiveness of the law is marginal;
the regulation in the public sector appears substantially to respond
to the problem which called it up. (E.g., a regulation applicable
only to public secondary school teachers reaches most secondary
school teachers, although a federal statute affecting only state university professors may reach barely more than half of all university professors.) The omission of private-sector counterparts of
28 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Railway Express Agency,
Inc., v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949): "It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all." Compare O'Meara
v. Washington State Bd. Against Discrimination, 58 Wash. 2d 793, 365 P.2d 1 (1961),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962) with Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 370
P.2d 313, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1962); Jones v. Haridor Realty Corp., 37 N.J. 384,
181 A.2d 481 (1962).

1969]

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES

761

regulated public employees may also be rationalized against an
equal protection claim in terms of some other characteristic associated with the fact of public employment and not equally present
in the private sector, e.g., the administrative ease or other lower
cost of securing compliance, and the lack of equivalent economic
constraints on government. Thus, the apparent underinclusive character of a regulation limited only to public employees may sometimes survive an equal protection objection on the basis that the
classification is, in point of fact, reasonably connected with a legitimate distinction.
None of this is to say that the courts ought not take a harder
look at regulations limited only to public employees for equal protection shortcomings. Surely they should do so. And in doing so,
they might well remember that the state is the state, to avoid missing the equal protection claim once again by rationalizing the
classification by exempting the government from constitutionally
imposed limitations when the government acts as employer, owner,
etc. Linde's thesis is an important one, then, even in the setting
of an equal protection claim alone, as it serves to strip away the
claim that there is something so uniformly or absolutely distinct
about public employment per se that such classification is always
and necessarily a reasonable one. A revisionist view, profiting from
Linde's observations, might more nearly hold that such a basis of
classification is presumptively· unreasonable, shifting to the state
the burden affirmatively to justify placing greater restrictions on
public employees than on their private-sector counterparts.29 But
the basic thesis is both stronger than and different from this one.
29 Such a presumption already obtains in a variety of areas. See, e.g., Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). See also Karst & Horowitz,
Reitman v. Mulkey: The Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 SuP. CT.
REV. 39. Convenience of administration may not, moreover, be sufficient to overcome
the presumption of unconstitutionality of certain disfavored classifications. Carrington
v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Harper v. Virginia, 383 U.S. 663 (1963). Where a
regulation reaches only employees in the public sector (or only" a portion of such
employees) without reaching their more numerous private counterparts, greater judicial activism and rigor in the application of the equal protection clause may be warranted than where the regulation binds a larger political class more substantially represented in the legislative process. The point was especially well made by Mr. Justice
Jackson, concurring in Railway Express Agency, Inc., v. New York, 336 U.S. 106,
(1949): "The framers of the constitution knew, and we should not forget today,
that there is no more effective practical guarantee against arbitrary and unreasonable
government than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose
upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to
arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a
few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution
that might be visited if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better
measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in operation."
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It posits that no degree of added reasonableness attaches to a regulation from the role of government as employer, and it frames a
new standard of substantive due process rather than a standard
of equal protection. Whatever would deny substantive due process
as a governmental restriction on private employment denies substantive due process as a condition or regulation of equivalent
public employment. Applying this test to our hypothetical cases
tends, moreover, to make some regulations more probably unconstitutional than we might otherwise have thought. It appears doubtful, for instance, that a state law requiring the dismissal of any
private employee convicted of any civil disturbance would be upheld, and even more doubtful that protection of ·the public from
the felt hazards of cigarette smoking would sustain a general statute requiring the dismissal of private employees who smoke. Is
the case any different though the rule in question immediately applies only to public employees? The implied answer is: "No."

The analogical model may also seem to breathe new life into
the eighth amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment in this connection. Policing the public health by mandating
dismissal of private employees who choose to blacken their lungs
surely strikes one as an eccentric way of exercising the police
power, and no less eccentric even if the regulation is rationalized as
a way of conserving manpower resources. It seems no less so, if
the analogy fits, when imposed as a condition on public employment.80

I
III.
There are, however, serious problems which need to be overcome before the analogical model Professor Linde proposes can
be generalized and safely applied. Without some degree of clarificaso The point is a limited one and not intended to carry beyond the observation
that where a regulation of employment threatens dismissal as a punishment for conduct
thought to be merely bad and undesirable in general, but not relevant to one's job
competence in any distinguishing respect, its distinctly punitive function should be
acknowledged and the appropriateness of discharge should be reviewable under the
eighth amendment as well as under the equal protection clause and possibly under the
attainder clauses of article I, sections 9 and 10.
In a few cases, courts have set aside conditions on public jobs where they were
ulterior to the function of the employment. See discussion and references in Bagley
v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 505-07, 421 P.2d 409, 414-15,
55 Cal. Rptr. 401, 406-07 (1966). In a larger sense, this approach is best seen
through the equal protection clause; even where the regulation may be said to serve
legitimate state interests, where it is imposed only on public employees and the purpose of the regulation does not coincide with a classification based on that employment relation, the regulation is arbitrarily underinclusive.
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tion and qualification, the argument may claim too much in suggesting that all conditions on public employment are constitutionally
indistinguishable from identical regulations of equivalent private
employment-that government derives no interests as employer
which it lacks as regulator.
The first qualification is merely one of explicit clarification.
Tile comparison to be made in each case is not between the particular condition of public employment and a hypothetical regulation of private employment in general, but between the condition
of public employment and the same regulation of equivalent jobs
in the private sector. If the case at lland involves a first amendment
claim that the government cannot discharge a ranking physicist
in the Atomic Energy Commission in spite of his knowing membership in the Communist Party, the comparision must fairly be made
only with· a statute restricting private employment in truly "equivalent" posts, i.e., those involving access to classified information,
responsibilities closely connected with risks to national security,
and authority possessed of considerable discretion. It would unfairly beg the question to compare the case at hand with one
arising under a restriction against the private employment of Communists in utterly nonsensitive and nondiscretionary jobs, or simply
jobs in general; they are clearly not "equivalent," and their probable immunity from political regulation provides no constructive
analogy.
The equivalency of the comparable private sector employment
must first be established then, and this may not always be an easy
task. In some instances, it is difficult to locate a private-sector
equivalent of the public employment under review (as is nearly
but not exactly true with an AEC physicist). In nearly every
instance, moreover, there is a great amount of guesswork in defining equivalency. Presumably, jobs are "equivalent" when they
are functionally the same in terms of the discoverable valid purposes
of the regulation in question-but courts (and counsel) must
frequently guess at or simply invent a statement of purposes validly
served by a given statute. Thus, we generously assumed that the
purpose of the regulation applied to our AEC physicist was narrowly
to safeguard national security rather than, say, simply to conserve
job opportunities, discourage Communist Party affiliation, or something else. The problem of inferring legislative purpose is no greater
here than elsewhere in the exercise of constitutional review, however,
and the use of the analogical model can thus scarcely be faulted on
this account alone.
Even assuming that we can unerringly hypothesize "equiv-
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alent" public and private jobs with sufficient ease to make the
model serviceable, we must also hypothesize the "same rule" as a
regulation of those private jobs. But as we shall try to hypothesize
the same rule, we shall also become aware of the fact that the private
and public situations are distinguishable in still another important
respect and that the distinction, once recognized, makes the private
case far less easy to resolve than we had imagined. Yet, it was due
to our faith that the private case is easier to resolve that we
thought it useful to develop it analogically so that we might borrow
the result and apply it to the actual case at hand. If the private
case turns out not to be any easier to resolve, it becomes correspondingly more doubtful whether the effort to make the analogy
was worthwhile after all.
For instance, let us suppose that we want to determine the
constitutionality of a rule which authorizes but which does not
require a public school board to dismiss any teacher who sports
sideburns more than 1-1/2 inches below his ears or a hair style
extending more than 1/2 inch down his collar.81 The equivalent
job in the private sector is almost surely a teacher's job in a private
school covering the same grade levels and, perhaps, involving the
same cultural cross section of students. Would the "same" rule
simply be a state statute which authorizes but which does not
require a private school board to dismiss any teacher who sports
sideburns more than 1-1/2 inches below his ears, etc.? The comparison becomes difficult to follow, for ordinarily a private school
board's authority so to restrict the conditions of employment of
its teachers would not require the existence of such a statute to
begin with. The private school might have reserved the right to
terminate a teacher for such cause without any such state statute,
by contract. Further, such a statute does not necessarily forbid the
private school to contract not to terminate its teachers for such
cause. In short, the contract and the contractual will of the parties
initially describe the private school relationship, and the hypothesized state statute contributes very little.
Would the analogy be clearer, however, if the public regulation
81 See Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis. 1969); Finot v. Pasadena
City Bd. of Educ., 250 Cal. App. 2d 189, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1967). Compare Ferrell
v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex. 1966), aff'd, 392
F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968). See also Breen v. Kahl, 296
F. Supp. 703 ( 1969) (public school regulation of hair length held unconstitutional
under due process clause of fourteenth amendment) ; Meyers v. Arcata Union High
School District, 269 A.C.A. 633, 75 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1969) hair length school regulation
held void for vagueness under fourteenth amendment); Leonard v. School Comm. of
Attleboro, 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965).
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provides that any public school teacher sporting the forbidden hair
style shall be dismissed (rather than that he may be dismissed)?
Shall we resolve the constitutionality of this rule by asking whether
it would be constitutional for the state to require the dismissal of any
similarly offending teacher in a private school, whether or not. the
school proprietors as well as the private teachers object to the
statute? Seemingly, this is the "same" rule, as far as the legitimacy
of the state's interest is concerned. If that interest reflects a settled
feeling that certain male hair styles set a "bad example" for the
young, detract from a desirable educational atmosphere, induce a
certain moral laxity or bohemian waywardness among students, and
that these concerns override the marginal claim of the individual
teacher's interests in personality, the situation is in these respects
unchanged in the context of the private school.
The cases are distinctly not the same in another critical respect,
however, as Professor Linde acknowledged in an important footnote.32 Rather, the regulation as extended to the private sector
trammels other important personal interests in addition to those
of the employee, namely, interests (or prerogatives) of the private
employer. Not only is the teacher forbidden to work without such a
restriction, but the school proprietors are similarly restrained in
their freedom to utilize their facilities in a manner which they
regard as most appropriate. There is, in short, a "property right"
interest of the private school which adds to the "civil liberties"
claim of the private teacher, much as there was in Truax v. Raich,S 3
Myer v. Nebraska/ 4 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 35 The number
and kinds of private prerogatives arranged against the regulation
are doubled; it is the difference between a state law allowing an
employer not to hire whom he pleases, on the one hand, and a law
compelling him to dispense with the services of another, regardless
of how he and the employee both feel, on the other hand. Where
the state itself is the employer, of course, it cannot, by definition,
have "private" interests different or apart from the policy the state
has adopted for itself as employer. But such a situation is manifestly not applicable to the private sector.
To return for a moment to our earlier case, we were considering
the statute which authorizes but does not require the firing of a
public school teacher in terms of whether a statute permitting but
not requiring the discharge of a private school teacher would be
82 Linde, supra note 12, 40 WAsH. L. REV. at 43, n.304.
88 239
33 (1915).
84 262
390 (1923).
85 268
510 (1925).

u.s.
u.s.
u.s.
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valid. If the statute as applied to a private school is interpreted to
permit such discharge even when the school has willingly contracted
not to discharge the teacher on such grounds, it becomes clear that
we have overextended the analogy once again. The private school
proprietors may not want such a restriction; they may indeed feel
that they can better compete for talented teachers by providing
them with an enforceable assurance that they will not be fired for
causes not immediately related to their job competence. The state
statute not only restricts the private school teacher in this view,
but it restricts the contractual and proprietary prerogatives of the
private school board as well. Again, the interests arranged against
the state statute are multiplied in a manner not subject to duplication when the only rule in question relates only to public rather
than to private school boards.
Nor is it entirely fair merely to say that the teacher's civil
liberties claims have been conjoined with the proprietors' "mere
property" claim, with both arranged against the policy of the state.
Rather, the proprietors may hold a distinct educational philosophy
which they wish to reflect in the kind of teachers they provide for
their students. They, like the teachers, may believe that a more
permissive and tolerant academic atmosphere is conducive to superior education. There is little reason to denigrate the proprietors'
interest as "merely" property, or othewise. to ignore it in the constitutional balance.
More importantly, however, it is only by ignoring this possible
conjunction of employer-employee interests in the private sector that
a great number of public employment regulations appear more
clearly unconstitutional than otherwise, because facile use of the
analogical model borrows from "same" cases where, in fact, the
constitutional objections to the regulation as extended into the
private sector are compounded. Professor Linde makes essentially
the same observation in a footnote caveat where he wrote:
To avoid misunderstanding: The present point is that, against an
objection under the first, fourth, or fourteenth amendments, the validity of a governmental restraint in a publicly-owned place depends on
whether government could, under the same conditions, and over the
same objection, validly impose the same restraint in a similar privately-owned place. It leaves aside claims against land-use controls
based on the private owner's property rights under the due process
and just compensation clauses.36
86 Linde, supra note 12, 40 WASH. L. REv. at 43, n.304. The distinction was
acknowledged even as long ago as Mr. Justice Holmes' otherwise regrettable opinion
in Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511, 39 N.E. 113 (1895), aff'd, 167 U.S. 43
(1897), where he acknowledged that the presence of "proprietary rights" (i.e., private
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If one is obliged to disentangle the private property owner's own

claims, or the private employer's own prerogatives, from those of
the private employee in the analogical model, however, one may
wonder whether the model does not lose most of its alleged value
in clarifying the constitutionality vel non of a rule applicable only
to public employees. The test which emerges is this: A condition
imposed on public employment is not valid unless it would be valid
if imposed as a regulation of private employees in equivalent jobs
as against constitutional claims of such private employees alone
(without consideration of whatever claims the private employer
might also have and without knowing how the private employer
feels about the situation). Thus qualified, the model achieves the
necessary precision, but the task of separating employee from employer interests and setting aside the latter makes it terribly hard
to use.
Even with these qualifications, the model may still be far from
perfect. In posing and testing various regulations in the public
sector, we are almost inevitably drawn to illustrations where the
employee's "constitutional right" to substantive due process is
easily verbalized in terms of one or more of the guarantees in the
Bill of Rights, especially the first amendment's explicit protection of
free speech.37 This habit of mind tends to reduce the field of human
interests where recognizable constitutional claims can arise and
correspondingly turns us away from seeing defects in the analogical model which would surely be noted if less familiar comparisons
were made. We think almost reflexively or exclusively in terms of
explicitly protected Bill of Rights interests, e.g., speech, religion,
assembly, and press. 38 More accurately, however, the concept of a
broader substantive due process still lives, and under certain cir~
cumstances, almost any imaginable human interest may be protected from inhibitory legislation. One's interest in moving from
ownership) would affect the constitutionality of a state law restricting places where
speeches might be heard.
37 Note that Professor Linde's qualifying quotation, see note 36 and accompanying text, supra, puzzlingly restricts the use of his test to objections raised "under
the first, fourth, or fourteenth amendments." In context, it appears that he means to
limit the utility of the test to explicitly named rights, e.g., speech and religion in the
first amendment made applicable to the states via the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, although it is somewhat a mystery why other explicit rights (e.g.,
self-incrimination in the fifth amendment) are not mentioned and, of course, fourth
amendment substantive rights, e.g., privacy as inferred by Justice Douglas in Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), are not "explicitly" named in the fourth
amendment at all.
3 8 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, n.4 (1938).
But see Braden, The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 57 YALE L.J. 571
(1948); McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation
·
and Reburial, 1962 SuP. CT. REv. 34.
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place to place, for instance, has recently been subsumed as an
interest sheltered by the (substantive) due process clause of the
fifth amendment under some circumstances. 39 One's interest in
sexual intercourse within the marriage relation is subsumed in the
(substantive) due process of the fourteenth amendment under some
circumstances. 40 Indeed, even interests in group association are not
explicitly protected even in the first amendment itself. "Freedom
of association" has been given separate constitutional status under
the (substantive) due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
for reasons fulfilling alleged functions of explicit first amendment
interests, to be sure; but it receives protection as an independent
interest and sometimes without particular reference to the political
focus of speech and assembly. 41 Mr. Justice Black to the contrary
notwithstanding, 42 Lochner v. New York 48 is not dead in the sense
that only "explicitly" named interests (i.e., those set out somewhere
in the substantive portions of the Bill of Rights) find shelter in
substantive due process. 44 Even one's homely interest in the wear39 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Aptheker v. Secretary
of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
4 0 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), resting an alternative holding on substantive due process
grounds, in keeping with (then) Justice Traynor's opinion in Perez v. Sharp, 32
Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
41 See, e.g., Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964);
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). See also Emerson, Freedom
of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L,J. 1 (1964).
42 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
515 (1969) (dissenting); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). From his opinion
in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), it would appear that Mr. Justice
Douglas agrees that the character of interests protected by the fourteenth amendment
is determined by reference to the more specific enumeration of protected interests in
the Bill of Rights, but he finds a much larger array of such interests implied in the
Bill of Rights than does Mr. Justice Black.
43 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Note that without abandoning the principle that substantive due process brings "mere" economic interests within range of constitutional
review, Lochner did not necessarily carry with it an unyielding absolutism in the
measure of protection thus provided. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917); Muller
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
44 See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263 n.11 (1967): "We recognized in Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. at 442, that 'the right to hold specific private
employment and to follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental
interference comes within the "liberty" and "property" concepts of the Fifth Amendment.'"
It does not necessarily follow from the mere fact that an interest is classified as
one of substantive due process that the Lochner standards in reviewing the "reasonableness" of a state's interference with that ·interest are applicable. Arguably, this
aspect of Lochner retains vitality only when the interest seeking protection can be
verbaHzed as a "preferred" one within the Bill of Rights itself. See, e.g., Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). However, this restricted role of the Lochner standards in reviewing the reasonableness of state legislation does not explain the strict
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ing of long hair may be constitutionally protected in the acid sense
that a state law forbidding such a thing anywhere or anytime may,
under some circumstances, at least, be so outrageous as to be invalid as applied-a petty denial of substantive due process.
Of course, opinions will not be phrased in terms of a "constitutional right to wear long hair," for that demeans a court and
degrades the document. Rather, it will be described, perhaps, as
an aspect of "personal integrity," or a right to be left alone, or
even forced into the first amendment itself, 45 just as, in Griswold,
interests in sexual intercourse are given greater dignity as a "right
of .marital privacy," and built up from penumbras of fourth amendments, and just as interests in maximizing profits were once elevated
as "freedom .of contract" or "rights of property." Correspondingly,
of course, even the explicitly protected rights are protected only
under some, not all, circumstances.
All of this, however much it may seem otherwise, does ultimately bear on the utility of the analogical model. For there are a
great number of never-questioned conditions on public employment
which might well raise substantial questions if recast as equivalent
regulations of the private sector; and yet their possible dubiousness
as state regulations in the private sector raises little serious question
when the state is the employer precisely because the state, as employer, may involve some interests it lacks as general regulator.
For instance, suppose the promulgation of a bureaucratic rule requiring all attorneys in the United States Department of Justice
to provide resumes of their work every twelve minutes on a daily
basis, the rule being applicable to all attorneys in every division,
indiscriminately and ultimately enforceable through an authority
to discharge attorneys unwilling to comply.46 Granted the arguable
unwisdom of the rule, should it also be conceded that it is constitutionally challengeable unless an identical requirement imposed
by the federal government on the private-sector counterparts of
judicial scrutiny employed in the recent equal protection cases. See generally Karst,
Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-LawDue-Process Formula," 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 716 (1969). In these cases, the interests
involved are classified as "basic" or "fundamental" or "critical"-but it seems clear
that this classification is not limited to interests considered to be protected by the Bill
of Rights itself. See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68 (1968); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). It
should also be observed that the Court may be indirectly returning to Lochner by its
very expansive reading of the Bill of Rights so that nearly everything can be said, in
one way or another, to be a "preferred" right.
45 See note 31 supra.
46 The hypothetical is, alas, not entirely fanciful. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1969,
§ I, at 25, cols. 1-5.
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these attorneys would clearly be valid? Is it possible that we might
well conclude that "penumbras of privacy," self-employment prerogatives, and even shades of first amendment protection (in anonymity) might insulate private practitioners from such officious
time-and-motion census taking without, however, sufficing to overthrow the scheme as restricited to government attorneys? 47 Is it
possible, in short, that government may be vouchsafed certain
interests qua employer which it lacks qua regulator, and that we
cannot therefore safely analogize the two roles for all purposes?
For instance, suppose we test an unexceptional regulation which
provides that a public school teacher reporting to work more than
half an hour late on more than six occasions during an academic
term without excuse for cause due to circumstances beyond his
control shal.l be dismissed. Does the constitutionality of such a
rule depend upon whether the state could similarly require the dismissal of any private school teacher identically late to work in his
private school on more than six occasions? Suppose the rule is that
public school teachers may have but one half-hour for lunch. Is it
invalid unless a law forbidding private school teachers to contract
for more than half an hour at lunch break is also constitutional?
No important public policy can honestly be said to be accomplished
by such a statute, and reasonable persons may be of different
opinions as to the desirable length of a lunchtime. The regulation
as a rigid constraint on private teachers (quite apart from the
interference with the private employers' interests) seems quite
arbitrary, displacing their wishes and serving no particular public
purpose. The needs of the schools and of the teachers alike are
surely better met by allowing greater flexibility to exist. At the
same time, a half-hour for lunch may not be too short to nourish a
teacher; the public school authority may find some advantage in
it; there is, after all, need for a line to be drawn somewhere for
ease of administration; the teacher cannot show in what respect
the rule seriously disadvantages him; and we are less likely to
quarrel with it as a rule within the discretion of state authorities
to adopt as a standard rule merely for the public schools. More
importantly, the state as employer or school proprietor does have
some choices which it cannot avoid making qua employer or qua
proprietor which it distinctly can and should avoid as regulator of
the private sector. To say that it cannot make any choice unless it
could also impose that choice on the private sector seems absurd.
47 See Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 277-78 (1968). Compare Garrity v.
New Jersey, 385 U.S. 593 (1967), with Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967). See
also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
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The two roles of government are not entirely fungible, and the
analogical model simply fails. To imply that with a dozen reasonably similar arithmetic books from which to choose, for instance,
the state may not choose any one for required and uniform use in
public schools unless it could insist that all private school teachers
must use that one, too, implies too much. There are needs of
economy of purchase, ease of administration and standardization
which may sustain the choice in the public sector, not sufficient in
themselves to oust the prerogatives of others to use different, albeit
equally competent books in private schools. Indeed, it may well be
that the protected pluralism of the private sector is all that makes
the uniformity of the public sector tolerable.
A parting observation may be made about the use of the
analogical model in association with one of Mr. Justice Douglas'
views of state action. In some fairly celebrated places, Mr. Justice
Douglas has implied that what is done in the private sector with
the mere permission or license of the state (and not merely by its
command or order) is done as though required by the state itself.48
By such reasoning, the merely licensed act of a private party is
reviewable against fourteenth amendment standards of due process
(substantive and procedural) and equal protection. Coupling this
view with the analogical model produces a dizzying circle of constitutional analysis that becomes impossibly difficult to penetrate,
however, and it tends to yield results quite opposed to what the
model was practically meant to do. For, working backwards, it
appears to imply that whatever a state can constitutionally permit
to exist in the private sector, it may also adopt as a requirement in
the public sector without the standard becoming any less constitutional. If, then, a licensed drug store is constitutionally free to
hire only druggists who are Democrats, the state may itself likewise hire only democratic druggists. If a licensed private school
could forbid its teachers to wear beards, then so may the state
forbid its teachers to wear beards.49 In short, the development of a
48 Se.e, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 242, 255-60 (1964) (concurring
opinion); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 274, 276-83 (1963) (concurring
opinion); Gamer v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 176, 182-85 (1961) (concurring
opinion); Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292, 300 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
In fact, however, Justice Douglas' views on the application of the fourteenth amend- .
ment to the private sector is much more complicated and sensitive than this, taking
into account such additional considerations as the character of the interests involved,
the kind and degree of governmental enforcement, and the scope of impact of decisions
made in the private sector.
49 But see Mr. Justice Douglas' vigorous dissent to the Court's denial of certiorari
in Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 393 U.S. 856 (1968), in which he makes
a telling argument respecting the relevance of the equal protection clause to a public
school restriction on student hair length. Indeed, it should certainly be acknowledged
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theory originally designed to spread the coverage of the Bill of
Rights into influential parts of the private sector may, woodenly
applied, have the opposite effect of contracting coverage in the
public sector. Faced with the choice of either stratifying the prerogatives of private employers exactly to conform with constitutional norms in the public sector, or removing constitutional norms
from the public sector to correspond with pluralistic practices
extant in the private sector, a court is surely as likely to opt for
the second alternative as for the first. The case remains to be made,
however, that these are the only alternatives. We may need to bear
in mind that analogies are only analogies and, by definition, not
the "same."
IV.
The inflexible use of particular analogies, including the one
we have examined, has not in fact characterized Mr. Justice Douglas' contributions to the Court.5° Rather, his opinions fully reflect
the impression one gets simply from watching him within the Supreme Court itself. Incredibly restless on the bench, he conveys a
sense of impatience to reach central issues and an almost physical
brusqueness with procedural needlepoint. His manner implies that
counsel had best be right about the critical core of his case-that
appeals to judicial modesty, parades of horribles, administrative
ease and convenience, etc., are unworthy trade-offs for essential
principles of constitutional liberty.
Correspondingly, the Douglas opinions more than occasionally
are brusque and restless, too. They give fits to readers and offer
fair game to critics because they are seen as untidy and almost careless in their flow. They sometimes range far beyond the necessities
of the case, leaving broad pronouncements unelaborated (e.g., "Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the
Equal Protection Clause do change ... "),51 upsetting entire schools
of constitutional theory and distressing confidence in continuity.
Yet, without raking through thirty years of his work to make
the point again, I think it very clear that he has helped immeasurably to end the constitutional orphanage of public employees and
that we have gained, not lost, in loyalty and efficiency at the same
time. There is, moreover, an obvious explanation of his great and
steadfast contributions: Mr. Justice Douglas has a very rugged
Constitution.
that this brief article has concerned itself more with Professor Linde's analogical
model than with an attempt to capture even a significant part of Mr. Justice Douglas'
calculus of constitutional review.
50 See note 11 supra.
51 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
663, 669 (1966).

v.s.

